Struct Message 

pub struct Message { /* private fields */ }

A STUN message: the header, the attributes, and — once decoded — what the two integrity values said.

Implementations

impl Message

pub const fn new(class: Class, transaction: TransactionId) -> Self

An empty Binding message of this class.

pub fn with(self, attribute: Attribute) -> Self

Append an attribute.

Order is preserved, and only two attributes have a normative position: the two Message::encode appends itself.

pub const fn class(&self) -> Class

The message class.

pub const fn transaction(&self) -> TransactionId

The transaction this message belongs to.

pub fn attributes(&self) -> &[Attribute]

The attributes, in the order they appeared.

pub fn encode(&self, key: Option<&str>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error>

Encode, appending MESSAGE-INTEGRITY keyed with key when there is one, and then FINGERPRINT, in that order and always last (RFC 5389 §15.4, §15.5).

key is None only for RFC 8445 §11’s keepalive, which “MUST NOT utilize any authentication mechanism”. FINGERPRINT is not optional: spec §11.1 puts it on every check, every response and every keepalive, and it is what lets the far end tell a check from RTP on the one port they share.

pub fn decode(datagram: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Error>

Read a datagram the media port’s demultiplexer called STUN (RFC 5764 §5.1.2, crate::dtls::classify).

Nothing here trusts the datagram. A FINGERPRINT that does not match is an error, per RFC 5389 §15.5, because a message whose CRC is wrong is not addressed to us however well formed it is; a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY cannot be checked yet, because which key applies depends on the USERNAME this message carries — see Message::verify_integrity.

pub fn verify_integrity(&self, key: &str) -> bool

Whether this message’s MESSAGE-INTEGRITY was computed with key.

false when there is none at all: an unauthenticated check is not a check that happens to verify, and spec §11.3 requires that it move no state.

Which key to pass is the direction rule — Peering::inbound_key for a check that arrived, Peering::outbound_key for the response to one sipx sent.

pub const fn has_integrity(&self) -> bool

Whether a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY was present at all.

pub const fn has_fingerprint(&self) -> bool

Whether a FINGERPRINT was present. If it was, it matched — Message::decode rejects one that does not.

pub fn username(&self) -> Option<&str>

The USERNAME, if there is one.

pub fn priority(&self) -> Option<Priority>

The PRIORITY a check claims for the candidate the peer would learn from it (§7.1.1).

pub fn use_candidate(&self) -> bool

Whether USE-CANDIDATE is set (§7.1.2).

pub fn role(&self) -> Option<RoleAttribute>

The role attribute and its tiebreaker, if the peer sent one (§7.1.3).

A peer that sends neither is not doing role signalling, which spec §7.3’s last row says is not a conflict. nominate reports USE-CANDIDATE alongside ICE-CONTROLLING; a controlled peer that sets it anyway is violating §7.1.2, and the caller sees that as a Controlled role with Message::use_candidate true.

pub fn error_code(&self) -> Option<u16>

The ERROR-CODE, if this is an error response. 487 is the role conflict of §7.3.1.1.

pub fn mapped_address(&self) -> Option<SocketAddr>

The XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS, unobfuscated.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for Message

fn clone(&self) -> Message

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for Message

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl PartialEq for Message

fn eq(&self, other: &Message) -> bool

Tests for self and other values to be equal, and is used by ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Tests for !=. The default implementation is almost always sufficient, and should not be overridden without very good reason.

impl Eq for Message

impl StructuralPartialEq for Message